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Abstract 
This study aimed at assessing the impact earnings management has on corporate performance of firms on the 
Ghana Stock Exchange. The study used discretionary accruals of the modified jones model, abnormal cashflow 
from operations, abnormal discretionary expenses and abnormal production cost to measure earnings management 
whiles corporate performance was measured using return on assets. The study used a sample of 14 listed companies 
on the Ghana Stock Exchange (GSE) for the period of 2008 to 2018. We applied multiple linear regression for 
hypothesis testing. The findings of the study indicate that firm listed on the GSE engages earnings management 
and manages earnings upwards. Our results indicate earnings management through both accrual earnings and real 
earnings management techniques have a significant positive effect on corporate performance. Therefore, we 
recommend an intensive evaluation by the users of financial statements to make competent decisions. 
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1 Introduction 
Earnings intuitively called net profit or net income is a single valuable item presented in a firm’s income statement. 
The primary focus is to provide financial information about a firm’s performance to stakeholders and for 
management decision purposes. It serves as a proxy for the measurement of the financial wellbeing of firms so as 
to ascertain the wealth of stockholders. Firms keep an attractive value to attract the public as indicated by Tabassum, 
(2015) that prospective investors and corporations are attracted by the positive earnings status of firms that leads 
to the rise in stock prices. In view of this, managers attempt to yield prospective and influential earnings goals by 
using strategies and techniques through the provided generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) to alter 
reported earnings. This phenomenal attempt or act is referred to as earnings management.     
Schipper (1989) defined earnings management as a “purposeful intervention in the external financial 
reporting process with the intent to obtaining one private gain”. Although this definition points out the 
opportunistic behavior of managers, the likelihood of this drive could be considered to be a win situation for 
shareholders as well. Earnings management can also be defined as a process used in the Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP) discipline by managers to manipulate reported figures to misinform users with 
interest in such figures (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). Managers to an extent diverge from reporting the optimal nature 
of firms and such engagements detriment the firm’s operations leading to future real economic costs. (Ewert & 
Wagenhofer, 2005). 
In the last decade, many firms in Ghana especially in the banking sector have either been closed down or 
collapsed and vulnerable investors and customers are the few who suffered the most among other stakeholders. 
The collapse of such firms was attributed to lack of eligible working capital for operations, however, there was no 
study or retrospective investigations to affirm the failure was due to any other effect other than the former or the 
failure was caused by other economic factors or management operations. Such situations bring fears to owners, 
investors, peer firms and other concerning parties. Respectively, this study is purposely made to make 
investigations into a possible cause that could affect the corporate performance or destroy the value of firms in 
Ghana. We therefore look at earnings management and the influential possibilities to firm performance. We believe 
management uses various methods to manage earnings of firms. Examples of such methods are early recognition 
of revenue, using estimates to inflate earnings, deliberately delaying earnings and a lot more. These methods impair 
the transparency, reliability and accuracy of financial reports and can lead to poor decision making (Mintz,2006) 
and devalue the financial health of firms (Darmawan, T, & Mardiati, 2019) 
This study explores the relationship between earnings management practices and corporate performance 
measured by Return on Assets (ROA). Earnings management methods in this study is classified into accrual 
earnings management (AEM) and real earnings management (REM). AEM is applied by making changes to the 
accounting methods like method of calculating depreciation. REM is also applied by making changes to the 
structure and time of operations or financial transactions.  Unlike developed countries like the US and UK, the 
practice of earnings management is prevalent in developing countries (Matteo & Francesco, 2018; Khuong et al. 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online)  
Vol.11, No.10, 2020 
 
2 
2019; Blkasem & Mansor, 2019); this is due to weak enforcement of laws which makes room for the workaround 
of underlying financial performance in firms. Considering Ghana as an emerging economy country (Agyekum et 
al., 2014; Yiadom, 2015), our study is based on the non-financial firms listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange.  
Despite the intense practice of earnings management, limited studies have been conducted on the relationship 
between accrual earnings management (AEM) and real earnings management (REM) and firm performance in 
Ghana. We find several AEM studies compared to REM and their relationship between performance. We measure 
earnings management through AEM and REM and how the comprehensive application of these two techniques 
relate to performance. We also expand the firm year observations of this study which is relatively wider than 
previous studies (Agyekum et al., 2014; Yiadom, 2015) to deepen and gain a wider overview.  
We apply a multiple linear regression in this study using a secondary data gathered from the Ghana Stock 
Exchange for the period of 2008 to 2018. We measure AEM with discretionary accruals and measure REM through 
the manipulation of sales, the reduction of discretionary expenses and overproduction. There are several models 
for detecting earnings management but this study uses the renowned yet the most efficient modified Jones model 
(MJM 1991) to detect AEM (Dechow et al., 1995) and considers Roychowdhury (2006) in measuring REM.  We 
consider return on assets (ROA) as the measurement of firm performance and further employ return on equity 
(ROE) in our robustness test to ensure validity and reliability of results.  
This study makes contributions to researchers by increasing the understanding on earnings management and 
firm performance as well. It contributes to research on the complementary application of AEM and REM. Also, it 
contributes to research on relationship between ROA and each component of REM measurements. We as well 
expect this study to be of value to stakeholders, investors and regulators in Ghana particularly to identify and make 
positive decisions on investments and management as it will facilitate the understanding on how firms manipulate 
earnings.  
The rest of the paper introduces literature and hypothesis development in section 2. Section 3 exhibits 
population sample, data collection and methodology. In section 4, results and discussions. Our final section 
presents conclusion, limitations and recommendations.   
 
2 Literature and Hypothesis Development 
Numerous researches have been conducted to discover the existence of earnings management and the intensity of 
the practice in factoring the eligibility threshold of firms’ value and listing on the stock market. Earnings 
management is a system for manipulating information and statistics that legally abuse the versatility of GAAP in 
order to display the content of financial statements in an unreal picture which is contrary to the actual performance 
of a firm in order to achieve its own management interests (Healy & Wahlen, 1999; Ding et al., 2018).  
The primary purpose of financial statements is to provide quality and useful information to promote and 
facilitate decisions made by stakeholders. (Mackenzie et al., 2005; Ruiz 2016). Quality reporting of financial 
statements is strongly recommended to ensure the validity and quality of decisions that rely on the reported 
earnings. Agency theory draws out the separation of managers acting as agents and the actual owners of the firms 
(shareholders) provoke the existence of information asymmetry and agency cost. In the absence of shareholders 
playing a role in the daily activities of the firm, managers prioritize their selfish gains by exploiting their interests 
at the expense of shareholders. In an attempt to seek their personal interest in accordance with signal theory, 
managers employ earnings management mechanisms that are not known to shareholders when they are preparing 
financial statements, nullifying the quality of the report (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). Shareholders may incur cost 
to restrict the divergence of the managers' interest by providing appropriate measures (Jensen & Mickling, 1998; 
Linder & Foss, 2015). 
The existence of earnings management arises in many ways as managers gather the motivation force through 
the primary goal of meeting thresholds or earnings benchmarks (Li et al., 2011). Outlining the internal causes of 
earnings management; we find managers to focus on their future compensation or bonus plans as a driven force 
behind earnings manipulation (Shuto, 2007), the manipulation of results due to weak monitoring mechanisms that 
could be caused by high level of information asymmetry (Mikhail et al., 1999; Vander & Willeken, 2000; Arnedo 
et al., 2007) and lastly capital market motivation as an internal factor that provokes the practice of earnings 
management as managers attempt to avoid losses, manage earnings upward to meet market expectations. The 
fundamental intention is to gain advantage over analysts by meeting their forecasts to guarantee the future growth 
predictions (Myers et al., 1999; Keung et al., 2010; Verma, 2014; Ruiz, 2016).  
 
2.1 Real Earnings and Accrual Earnings Management 
Earnings management is classified into two methods in this study; Real Earnings Management (REM) and Accrual 
Earnings Management (AEM). REM is undertaken by making changes to the structure of operation, investment 
and financial transactions. AEM is applied by changing accounting estimates such as estimates for doubtful debts 
and changes in the method of depreciation. As managers find it risky to rely on only one of either REM or AEM 
in order to achieve target earnings, both techniques are considered by normally engaging REM during a fiscal year 
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and engage in AEM post fiscal year end (Rochowdhury, 2006). 
Due to the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley act of 2002, firms have diverted their earnings approach to REM from 
AEM. Graham et al. (2005) conducted a study and found out that 80% of managers manage earnings by applying 
REM technique instead of AEM. Literature showed evidence that AEM has a significant relationship with REM 
and both techniques are applied through substitution and complementing methods in different countries (Chou & 
Lee, 2018). The application of REM significantly increased in an attempt to meet earnings benchmark as managers 
tend to reduce the application of AEM (Cohen et al., 2007; Cohen & Zarowin, 2010; Chan et al., 2015)   
Das & Jena, (2016) examined the relationship between AEM and REM in the Indian context to test whether 
companies choose substitute relationship over complementary relationship. The results suggested that Indian 
companies undertake both AEM and REM with a higher predisposition towards AEM. The positive association 
established supports complementary relationship between the two which indicated that Indian companies use AEM 
and REM to generate greater benefit from earnings management. Contrary, Khunkaew & Qingxiang (2019) 
examined the association between AEM and REM based on 1471 Thai firm observation from 2014-2017 and the 
results demonstrated a negative relationship between AEM and REM. This implies that Thai firms listed use AEM 
and REM methods as substitutes. 
In times of high REM cost, Chen et al., (2009) added that managers reduce the level of investment in the first 
period to cut cost of REM in the next period. In the end, earnings will increase when investment is cut in the short 
run. In that study also, two explanations were made that, future earnings will decrease as managers cut some 
excessive investment in the first period and secondly, the investment cut down in the first period will possibly 
increase short-term earnings. Hence, managers exercise interest in reducing AEM to save for the future since they 
are less concerned about short-term performance. 
An empirical investigation into earnings management was made in firms with poor environment performance 
rating using listed firms in Indonesia from 2002 to 2009 and results show firms report downward earnings to 
anticipate and avoid political costs and tax (Nurdiniah & Herlina, 201; Yorke et al., 2016). Verily, the employment 
of earnings management has received attention with the major concern on the application technique whether the 
purpose of which earnings are managed is to increase or decrease the report.  
Examinations have affirmed the existence and practice of earning managements whether AEM or REM in 
different firm industries and countries.  Researches done on the BRIC-countries and other developing economies 
indicate the existence of earnings management practices (Shahzad, 2016; Saidu et al. (2017); Matteo and Francesco 
(2018); Khuong et al. (2019); Blkasem & Mansor (2019). We therefore expect to detect earnings management 
practice in firms listed on Ghana Stock Exchange which happens to be one of the developing countries.  
H1: Listed firms in Ghana engage in AEM and REM activities. 
 
2.2 Earnings Management and Firm Performance 
The intensity of earnings management keeps submerging into the affairs of firms so far as their performance and 
future economic values are concerned. Highlights into the manipulation of income practices by firms to gain 
market recognition have been made and we find the true performance of firms have been affected by such 
recognition factor. 
Firm performance can be manipulated to present good reports to corporate boards and investors and we find 
earnings management as the motivator. Managers reluctantly announce earnings that do not meet analysts’ forecast 
since it negatively impacts the performance and possibly the market value (Cohen et al., 2010). In situations like 
this, managers manipulate the elements of the financial statements specially through the balance sheet and income 
statement by employing accrual techniques and the practice of real earnings management to maximize the 
performance of the firms. We commonly find activities such as reducing discretionary spending on R&D, 
advertising and maintenance, the lenient credit sales terms and discounted sales to report higher earnings. 
Earnings management affects firm performance and tempers with shareholders wealth simply because it 
involves a deliberate altering of financial information to either misled investors on the real economic position of a 
firm or to gain some contractual benefits that depend largely on accounting numbers (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986; 
Healy & Wahlen, 1999). Research in this area has put light on possible factors and circumstances that attract 
managers to practice earnings management to achieve their targets. Studies have discussed the extent of this 
practice and the performance of firms under different countries and their related different factors. In order to 
provide the existence of the relationship between earnings management and firm performance, we consider the 
following empirical evidence.  
Commonly, it has been found that when the performance of a firm is low, the adoption of earnings increasing 
strategies come in to manage earnings upwards, likewise, when there is high performance, the alternate of income 
decreasing strategies are used to manage earnings downwards. However, Linck et al., 2013 found firms in financial 
constraint with valuable projects and good investment opportunities adopt discretionary accruals mechanisms to 
signal positive prospects in order to raise capital for investment. Mostafa (2020) examined whether firms with low 
performance manage earnings than high performing firms and affirmed in his studies that firms with low 
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performance increase their earnings management practices to boost performance as compared to firms with higher 
performance due to the weakness of shareholder protection and regulatory enforcement in Egypt. 
In low performance periods, managers could manage earnings to shield their positions from losses in order 
to avoid revealing negative performance and this is common in firms with huge accruals (Cornett et al., 2009; 
Iatridis & Kadorinis, 2009).  Consistently, Lee et al. (2006) used a sample of 67 non-financial firms from 1988 to 
2001 to investigate the relationship between earnings management and firm performance. The results show that 
firms with higher performance increase reported earnings. However, they find a negative association between 
reported earnings and expected growth. 
Tabassum et al., (2015) studied the manufacturing sector of Pakistan from 2004 to 2011 using abnormal 
operating cash flows, abnormal discretionary expenses and abnormal production cost as proxies for real earnings 
management. The results came out with a negative earnings management effect on financial performance. Gill et 
al. (2013) examined the earnings management and firm value of manufacturing firms using Jones accrual model 
in India and the results showed the practice of earnings management is greater and has a diverse effect on return 
on assets.  
Nuryaman (2013) also studied the post issue IPOs companies’ operating performance by exploring the 
influence of earnings management on stock returns whilst taking into consideration the roles of audit quality as a 
moderating variable. The sample of the study comprised of 149 manufacturing companies that were listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange in the year 2010. The total accruals were decomposed to obtain abnormal accruals value 
using Jones (1991) model. Khuong et al. (2019) analyzed the influence of real earnings management on firm 
performance of energy listed firms on Vietnam stock exchange and determined that real activity earnings 
management positively impacts firm performance implying that current sales activities do have a positive impact 
on current earnings. Firm size, cash from operating activities, return on assets and return on equity as measurement 
of firm performance all had positive association with earnings management. Mostafa (2020) made a study on firms 
listed on the Karachi Stock Exchange in Pakistan resulted in a positive significant impact between earnings 
management and return on assets. 
Investigations have shown a negative correlation between accruals and earnings. It was found that, per an 
increase in earnings, accruals are exercised more to offset cashflows in periods where it will be realized rather than 
the actual earnings. (Chen et al., 2017; Frankel & Sun, 2018).  In their study, discussions were made that a decrease 
in cashflows could result in the increase of accruals by managers’ discretion when accruals are estimated and 
reported wrongly to present high earnings to investors. 
Given the presence of earnings management and firm performance, existing studies have examined the 
relationship between them and indicated contradicting evidence of positive relationship (Khuong et al. 2019; 
Mostafa, 2020) and others, a negative relationship (Tabassum et al., 2013; Gill et al., 2013; Frankel and Sun, 2018). 
More often than not, the presence of negative relationship comes as a result of strictness and reassessment of 
reports by investors and regulators using other financial information. On the contrary, previous studies asserted 
that the practice of earnings management has positively impacted firm performance due to poor regulations and 
weak perceptions about reported figures. Ghana is a developing country and studies have shown a prevailing 
practice of earnings management due to weak regulations and scrutinizing of accounting procedures (Khuong et 
al., 2019). With the view that management manage earnings to show positive performance in firms to mislead 
investors, the displayed performance could result in positive feedback so as far as the stock market and 
performance of the firms are concerned. We then develop hypothesis as follows; 
H2: AEM positively impacts performance of listed firms on the Ghana stock exchange. 
H2b: REM positively impacts performance of listed firms on the Ghana stock exchange. 
 
3 Methodology 
This study adopted descriptive statistics and panel data analysis to examine the trend of earnings management and 
corporate performance. Specifically, the data gathered were quantitative in nature and further analytical tests of 
data variables and regression were made. We test for multicollinearity to ascertain the level of intercorrelation to 
ensure the absence of inaccurate reaction of variables on each other. Our main analysis was tested by applying 
multiple linear regression to seek the impact of our independent variables on the dependent variable. 
 
3.1 Sample selection and data collection 
This study focuses on examining the relationship between earnings management (accrual earnings management 
and real earnings management) and firm performance in non-financial firms listed on the Ghana stock exchange. 
The first stage of sample selection considered a total number of 43 listed firms. In the second stage, we purposively 
opted out banks and other financial institutions and omitted firms with incomplete financial reports to ensure data 
availability within the period of study as well as firms that use currency other than Ghana Cedi as their functional 
currency. 
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Table 1 below shows the sample of 14 firms drawn from the population from the period 2008 to 2018. 
 
Sample Selection Process 
 
 Firms 
Firms listed on the GSE  
Less: 
43 
Firms not listed on the GSE mainboard 11 
Firms from the financial industry 14 
Firms without complete annual reports from 2008 
Firms with different functional currency 
    3 
    1 
Final sample 14 
The data for the study were collected from the website of Ghana Stock Exchange, independent company 
official websites and annualreportsghana.com. 
 
3.2 Variables description 
All variables are summarized and presented in Table 2. 
 
3.3 Measuring accrual earnings management 
Following Dechow et al. (1995), we measure accruals management using discretionary accruals as a proxy. 
Accruals include discretionary accruals and non-discretionary accruals. Non-discretionary accruals are restricted 
by regulations and institutions whereas discretionary accruals can be exploited by managers hence discretionary 
accruals is reserved as an indicator in the detection of earnings management. Therefore, the mean value of 
discretionary accruals indicates the level of AEM for all selected firms. Firstly, we estimate discretionary accruals 
by regressing parameters α1, α2 and α3 using the Modified Jones model (1995) below; 
 
All variables are scaled by total assets at year beginning to adjust for heteroscedasticity. 
Secondly, we estimate the regression parameters ,  and  to estimate non-discretionary accruals; 
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The measure of discretionary accruals DACC, is estimated by the difference between TACC and the 
regressed estimate of NDACC. The absolute value is the indicator of the level of accrual earnings management. 
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Where; 
  !""#,$  = Total accruals in year t computed as difference between net income and cash flow from 
operating activities.  !""#,$  = NET INCOME – CFO  
  !$ = Total assets at the beginning of year t, 
 ∆%&'#,$ = Change in revenue in firm i in year t 
 ∆%&"#,$ = Change in receivables in firm i in year t 
 ((&#,$  = Gross property, plant and equipment in firm i in year t 
 )*!""#,$   = Non-discretionary accruals. 
 *!""#,$ = Discretionary accruals 
 +$  = Error term 
 
3.4 Measuring real earnings management 
Following Roychowdhury (2006); Baatour et al., 2017; Khuong et al., 2019; Darmawan et al., 2019), we apply 
three basic measures of real earnings management based on abnormal operating cash flows (AB_CFO), abnormal 
discretionary expenses (AB_DISEXP), and abnormal production cost (AB_PROD). We cross sectionally regress 
the parameters to estimate the normal levels of cash flows, discretionary expenses and production cost. The 
residual, which is considered to be the normal level is further subtracted from the actual level to obtain the 
abnormal levels.  Hence, a mean value for the individual basic measures reports the existence for the respective 
		
,

,
= 


,
+  
∆
, − ∆	
, 

,
 +  

, 

,
+ ,                                         (1) 
  
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online)  
Vol.11, No.10, 2020 
 
6 
measures of REM in all selected firms. The measurement of the various proxies of real earnings management are 
as follows; 
We use the below model to estimate the normal operation cash flow; 
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We estimate normal discretionary expenses as follows: 
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We estimate normal production cost with the model below: 
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Where: 
"BC$ = Cash flow from operation firm i in year t.  
(%C*$   = Production cost of firm i in year t. computed by  "CDE + ∆F)'&) C%G 
*FE&H($  = Discretionary expenses of firm i in year t.  
ABKLM  = Abnormal cash flow from operation.  
ABNOPQRS = Abnormal discretionary expenses.  
 ABSTMN = Abnormal production cost.  
 !$  = Total assets of firm i in year t-1.  
E$   = Total sales of firm i in year t.  
∆E$  = Changes in sales of firm i in year t.  
∆E$   = Changes in firm sales i in year t-1.  
+$  = Error.  
 
3.5 Measuring firm performance 
Data used in this study for measuring firm performance were acquired from the annual reported financial 
statements of firms listed on the Ghana stock exchange.  
Following (Ding et al., 2018; Liu, 2018; Petitjean, 2019), Return on assets (ROA) is used as the proxy for 
firm performance. Return on assets shows how efficient a company uses its assets to generate earnings. ROA is 
estimated by dividing net income by total assets.  
 
3.6 Model specification 
We define the variables of the model that measure the earnings management and financial performance. The 
rationale behind these variables is due to their application in accounting literature to express the quality of firm 
performance and earnings management results. 
To test hypotheses 2a and 2b we construct a regression model to investigate the relationship between earnings 
management (AEM and REM) on firm performance. 
A62 =   0/ + 0;244 + 023456 + 023;<=>?@ +  0U23@A6; + 0V=<W> + 0X8 + 0Y8Z + ,  
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Table 2: Description of Variables 
Variable  Symbol Measurement 
Dependent variable   
Return on assets ROA Net income divided natural log of total assets 
 
Independent variables   
Discretionary accruals 
 
 
Abnormal Cash Flow 
 
Abnormal Discretionary expenses 
 
Abnormal Production Cost 
DA 
 
 
AB_CFO 
 
AB_DISEXP 
 
AB_PROD 
Total accruals minus Non-discretionary accruals 
 
 
Estimated value of Normal CFO from actual value of 
CFO 
 
Estimated value of normal Discretionary Expenses from 
actual value discretionary expenses 
Estimated value of normal production cost from actual 
value of production cost 
   
Control variables   
Firm size SIZE Natural log of total assets 
Leverage LEV Book value of debt divided by total assets 
Liquidity LQDT Current assets divided by current liability 
 
4 Results and Discussions 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 presents a detailed description of the selected variables used in this study. The dependent variable ROA 
and four other measurements of earnings management as our independent variables. Additionally, we introduce 
three control variables; firm size, leverage and liquidity. The mean value of ROA is 0.0793 which explains average 
profitability of the studied firms, a standard deviation of 0.323 and minimum and maximum of -0.520 and 3.722 
respectively. The minus sign on ROA minimum value indicates some firm made losses in the period of study 
analysis. The average value of DA is 0.133 with a standard deviation of 0.177. Minimum and maximum for DA 
are 0.00078 and 1.477 respectively. Mean value of AB_CFO, AB_DISEXP and AB_PROD is 0.74, 1.31 and 4.55 
respectively. Abnormal Cash flow shows the highest mean of 7.48 amongst the proxies for REM indicating firms 
engages in radical discount sales and lenient sales offers to boost revenue. Similar with AB_PROD, the higher 
mean value for AB_ DISEXP shows firms on average make huge spending on advertisement, R&D and other 
general expenses. Firm size denoted by SIZE which is the natural logarithm of firm total assets shows the highest 
average value amongst the control variables of 7.59 with a standard deviation of 0.78. 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev Minimum Maximum 
ROA 0.0793493 0.323954 -0.5200738 3.722273 
DA 0.1332606 0.1776485 0.0007868 1.477352 
AB_CFO 0.7482508 0.2217481 -1.179782 1.154691 
AB_DISEXP 1.3156108 0.5517862 -0.756073 4.769411 
AB_PROD 4.5594209 0.8521605 -4.190839 5.389097 
SIZE 7.59556 0.783432 5.97936 9.041197 
LEV 0.0822872 0.1332653 0 0.7449987 
LQDT 1.981798 2.65299 0.1615076 17.668 
 
4.2 Listed Firms in Ghana Engage in Real and Accrual Earnings Management 
Supporting (Agyekum et al., 2014; Yiadom, 2015; Shahzad, 2016), we confirm our first hypothesis that earnings 
management exist in firms listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange as discretionary accruals recorded a positive mean 
value of 0.133 indicating that, the sample firms engages in AEM to obtain desired profit and avoid reporting losses 
by increasing earnings.  
Similarly, we confirm the presence of REM as AB_CFO, AB_DISEXP and AB_PROD all recorded positive 
mean values for all selected firms indicating upwards earnings management to obtain desired profit. We can 
conclude that, having mean values greater than 0 represents the presence of upward earnings management likewise, 
negative values indicate the practice of downward earnings management per the models used in detecting AEM 
and REM and thus, the sample firms not only engage in earnings management but also uses the positive earnings 
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approach to report upward earnings. Our objective indicates no interest in the direction of earnings management; 
however, we signal an opposite outcome of results with the findings of (Taylor & Xu, 2010; Nurdiniah & Herlina, 
2015) asserting the presence of downward earnings management. We find our results consistent with 
(Roychowdhury, 2006; Chan et al., 2015) that firms employ both the AEM and REM techniques. We support 
Graham et al., (2005) in the sense that the application of REM is dominant over AEM in recent times and as well 
support (Saidu et al. 2017; Matteo and Francesco, 2018; Khuong et al., 2019; Blkasem and Mansor, 2019) that 
earnings management is very common in developing economies concurring with Mostafa, (2020) assertions that, 
firms under developing economies have more incentives to engage in earnings management activities. 
 
4.3 Correlation Analysis 
Table 4 reports the adoption of Pearson correlation of the variables in our study to establish a link between earnings 
management and financial performance of firms. We find all independent variables: DA, AB_CFO, AB_PROD 
but AB_DISEXP positively correlated with the dependent variable ROA. ROA is also positively related to our 
control variables, SIZE and LQDT but negatively related to LEV. The maximum correlation coefficient of the 
independent variables is 0.28 and thus, does not raise concerns about multicollinearity. As suggested by (Ziegel et 
al., (1996), our outcome is in accordance with the Pearson correlation coefficient which defines the independent 
variables to be inferior to 0.75. with respect to VIF, we conform with the rule that, a variable to inferior 5 (VIF<5) 
denoting the absence of multicollinearity in the variables. 
Table 4: Pearson Correlation Coefficient Matrix 
 ROA DA AB_CFO AB_DISEXP AB_PROD SIZE LEV LQDT VIF 
ROA 1.0000         
DA 0.2898* 1.000       2.94 
AB_CFO 0.2558* -0.7863* 1.0000      2.94 
AB_DISEXP -0.0338 -0.0323 -0.0297 1.0000     1.17 
AB_PROD 0.0716 -0.1140 0.1300 -0.3508* 1.0000    1.13 
SIZE 0.0945 -0.0791 0.0189 -0.0029 -0.0812 1.0000   1.13 
LEV -0.0559 -0.0886 -0.0358 -0.0221 0.0203 0.2356* 1.0000  1.18 
LQDT 0.0657 0.0632 0.0594 0.0174 -0.0304 -0.0389 -0.1500 1.0000 1.10 
MEAN VIF         1.66 
Note: * implies significant at 5%, VIF (Variance Inflation Factor) 
 
4.4 Regression analysis 
In attempt to confirm hypotheses 2 and 2b, we employed multiple linear regression in our regression analysis of 
which the study sought to examine. Table 5 reports the regression analysis that examines the relationship between 
earnings management (real and accrual earnings management) and corporate performance.  Results unveiled the 
coefficient of DA to have a positive significance of (0.80, z = 18.26). This result shows that a unit increase in DA 
will lead to a 0.80 increase in firm performance. The coefficient of abnormal cash flow is (0.76, z = 17.55). Taking 
into account the other measurement of real earnings management, we find both AB_DISEXP and AB_PROD to 
be significantly positive with coefficients of (0.020, z=1.92) and (0.018, z=2.59) respectively.  
Table 5: Regression results 
Variables Coefficient Standard Error Z P>| z | 
DA 0.8061246 0.0441557 18.26 0.000 
AB_CFO 0.7699556 0.0438681 17.55 0.000 
AB_DISEXP 0 .020603 0.010743 1.92 0.058 
AB_PROD 0.0189478 0.0073183 2.59 0.011 
SIZE 0.0548723 0.0077298 7.10 0.000 
LEV -0.127835 0.0581211 -2.20 0.030 
LQDT 0.0038954 0.003277 1.19 0.237 
CONS -0.3606948 0.0582492 -6.19 0.000 
R-squared 0.7975 F(7, 118) 66.38  
Adj R-squared 0.7855 Prob > F 0.0000  
  Number of obs 140  
  Number of grps 14  
We find control variables; SIZE to be positively significant with (0.0548, z=0.000), LEV turns out to be 
negatively significant (-0.127, z=0.30). By these results, we find that earnings management through sales 
manipulation, reduction in discretionary expenses and excess production positively impacts firm performance. The 
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independent variable depicted a 79.75% variability in our dependent variable. This shows that with the R-squared 
of 79.75%, the dependent variable return on assets is highly explained by the independent variables; accrual 
earnings and real earnings management as well as the control variables firm size, leverage and liquidity. 
 
4.5 Impact of Earnings Management (AEM and REM) on Firm Performance (ROA) 
On account of Table 5, results correspond to hypothesis 2 and hypothesis 2b of the study which indicates DA is 
significantly positive as well as the proxies of real earnings management to corporate performance. The finding of 
DA in this study is similar to Mostafa, (2020), who found that ineffective firms in Egypt are characterized upward 
accrual earnings practices to stabilize their performances as well the findings of Linck et al., (2013). We find results 
unsupportive to Younesi & Hashemijoo, (2012), who examined the relationship between earnings management 
and performance Malaysians and found a negative relationship following the acquisition date of shares as well as 
other previous findings (Shirzad et al., 2015; Okafor, 2018). Further, real earnings through cash flows results 
differently with other studies considering the evident approach of firms in Ghana to accelerate sales by offering 
discount sales to signal positive corporate earnings. This is consistent with findings of (Gunny, 2010; Kothari et 
al., 2016; Jiang et al., 2018; Khuong et al., 2019) that firms tend to accelerate profit and performance through 
accrual and real earnings management approach and contradicts findings of (Tang & Chang, 2014; Tabassum et 
al., 2015; Yorke et al., 2016; Tian et al., 2018 Dakhlallh, 2020) indicating negative relationships between proxies 
of earnings techniques and performance of firms. For the control variables, we found the firm size have a positive 
significant relationship with return on assets. Unlike leverage with a negative effect, same cannot be said about 
liquidity with an insignificantly result on return on assets.  
We consider our model to be valid and significant enough to jointly predict AEM and REM as suggested by 
Dakhlallh, (2020). Consistent with agency and signal theories, we found our results to be compatible with our 
hypothesis that the practice of earnings management positively affects firm performance. The results as well 
explains earnings management could help management to ease financial constraints by approaching investors and 
regulators with decent investment offers (Linck et al., 2013) 
 
4.6 Robustness test 
We conduct a robustness test to confirm the above results. Due to reason of brevity, we present the regression of 
results only. Results are presented specifically to indicate the replacement of return on assets (ROA) with return 
on equity (ROE) as the measurement of firm performance as our dependent variable. ROE is calculated as ratio of 
earnings before tax over total equity.  Our independent variables and control variables remain the same. Thus, we 
repeat the regression test for hypotheses 2 and 2b.   
Table 6: Regression results of robustness test using ROE 
Variables Coefficient Standard Error Z P>| z | 
DA 2.583749 0.8437295 3.06 0.003 
AB_CFO 2.242174 0.8577019 2.61 0.010 
AB_DISEXP 0.0463462 0.1819464 0.25 0.799 
AB_PROD -0.2515993 0.3779378 -0.67 0.507 
SIZE 0.4257538 0.1543291 2.76 0.007 
LEV -0.2957911 1.115507 -0.27 0.791 
LQDT 0.0031837 0.0616999 0.05 0.959 
CONS -3.283431 1.153757 -2.85 0.005 
R-squared 0.1522 F(7, 118) 3.03.  
Adj R-squared 0.1019 Prob > F 0.0058  
  Number of obs 140  
  Number of grps 14  
Table 6 presents the results of our robustness test. We find the results similar in terms of the association 
between earnings management and firm performance considering DA and AB_CFO to have a positive relationship. 
We however find no relationship between AB_DISEXP and AB_PROD with firm performance. 
 
5 Conclusion 
Contributing to literature, our study adds up to earnings management resources. We examined how the 
performance of firms via Return on asset (ROA) can be influenced by two earnings management techniques; 
accrual earnings management and real earnings management. The examination was instrumentalized by setting 
discretionary accruals as a proxy for accrual earnings and three other proxies; abnormal cash flow from operations, 
abnormal discretionary expenses and abnormal production cost constituting real earnings management. Studies 
have swiftly advanced in the quest of explaining the relationship between earnings management and firm 
performance and we affirm that with this study. 
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Initial assumptions of multicollinearity and highly correlated of data were present. Hence, series of test were 
done to clear doubts on the presence of multicollinearity to ensure data is confidently fit to produce valid results.  
Our initial examination established the existence of earnings management practices in listed firms on the 
Ghana Stock Exchange. We consider our results to affirm the need of putting measures and secured regulations to 
minimize the abnormal level of earnings management practices in developing economies especially in Ghana. 
Secondly, we assessed the extent to which earnings management affects firm performance. In the period of 2008 
to 2018 our regression results came out with positive relationship between our main variables of study which is in 
line with our stated hypothesis. Based on the analysis, we found that firms listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange to 
engage in both accrual and real earnings management practices with a positive significant effect on corporate 
performance.  
We count this study as a support and contribution to the limited number of studies that are made on earnings 
management and firm performance with a sample of Ghana firms by including both AEM and REM techniques in 
the measurement of earnings management with a wider year observation. We find our study to have contributions 
for investors, managers, academicians and regulators. It contributes to literature by addressing factors that account 
and result in the increment of earnings management to subsequent underlying outcome of such practice. We find 
the outcome to be positively connected with firm performance.  
Additionally, we can conclude that though the performance of non-financial firms listed on the Ghana Stock 
Exchange are positively affected, we strongly advice authorities and facilitators to enforce regulations to present 
transparent financial information to combat unprecedent mitigation of deceptive performance so as to regulate the 
level of discretion by managers. Also, in-depth analysis of financial statements must be exercised by prospective 
investors prior their investments. Positively, our study highlights the acceptance of earnings management by firms 
with prospective investment opportunities to improve their performance financially. Lastly, our study has 
contributed to knowledge on earnings management to have a positive implication on firm performance by signaling 
positive future performance rather than a harmful effect. 
 
5.1 Limitations 
Our study was on a limited number of sampled firms listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange and findings could not 
be generalized to other firms in Ghana. Our investigations into accrual earnings management was limited to the 
modified jones model other than numerous developed models. We also limited examination of firm performance 
by ROA without taking into account other measures of firm performance. We suggest an expanded dimension with 
regards to both earnings management and firm performance measurements.  
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